memory

The power of the mind to think of a past that no longer exists poses both empirical, psychological problems, and more abstract philosophical ones. The scientist wants to know how the brain stores its memories, and whether the mechanism is similar for different types of memory, such as short-term and long-term memories. The philosopher is particularly puzzled by the representative power of memory. That is, if I summon up a memory of some event, how do I know to interpret it as representing the past, rather than being a pure exercise of imagination? Is there a specific ‘feeling of pastness’? But if so, might I not then have the feeling, but not know to interpret that as a feeling of pastness? Indeed, is there always a present representation, or might memory be a form of direct acquaintance with the past? This might at least give us a justification of the confidence we place in memory. But is not the sceptical hypothesis proposed by Russell, that the earth might have sprung into existence five minutes ago, with a population that ‘remembers’ a wholly unreal past, at least logically possible? But if it is logically possible, the question of how we know that this is not what has happened is set to look intractable.